In the nearly thirty years that have passed since President Harry Truman issued the directives to support the partition of Palestine and afterward to recognize the State of Israel, the motivations of the President have been the subject of extensive historical discussion. A school of revisionist historiography has emerged which argues that President Truman’s Palestine policy was motivated by the purely political consideration of wooing the Jewish electoral vote. This argument casts a shroud of suspicion over the Truman Presidency, and portrays the birth of Israel, one of the most seminal events of modern times, as somehow illicit and ignoble. I had the privilege of serving as White House Counsel during this period and was in a position to observe the attitude of the President and the role of the State Department toward the Middle East. I am gratified that my recollections ofthat period are confirmed by documents now available. It is clear to me that the facts totally refute the assumptions of the revisionists.

Harry Truman assumed the Presidency at a critical moment in American history. His task was to look beyond the imminent defeat of the Axis and to begin the formulation of a comprehensive policy for the postwar era. He well appreciated that international peace and security were impossible until the havoc of the war was repaired by an American policy of enlightened rehabilitation. Not the least of the havoc, surely, was the appalling tragedy inflicted upon the Jewish people, hundreds of thousands of whose pathetic survivors were still impacted in the displaced persons camps of Europe. By then Harry Truman’s long history of sympathy for the underdog, in politics, economics, and religion, was a matter of record. Moreover, the President had evinced a sympathetic understanding of Zionism since his early manhood. As he wrote later in his autobiography:
I had familiarized myself with the history of the question of a Jewish homeland and the position of the British and the Arabs. I was skeptical … about some of the views and attitudes assumed by the “stripedpants boys” in the State Department. It seemed to me that they didn’t care enough about what happened to the thousands of displaced persons who were involved. It was my feeling that it would be possible for us to watch out for the long-range interests of our country while at the same time helping these unfortunate victims of persecution to find a home.

March 8, 1948. Memorandum, Clark Clifford to President Harry Truman:

May 12, 1948. Memorandum of Conversation, Secretary of State George C. Marshall:

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